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HOW THE RICH STAY RICH:
USING A FAMILY TRUST COMPANY TO SECURE A FAMILY FORTUNE
Iris J. Goodwin*

He started a story that began, "The very rich are different from you and me." Someone
said, "Yes, they have more money."
-

Ernest Hemingway, The Snows of Kilimanjaro

We’re not a family… we’re a firm!
-

King George VI about the British Royal Family1

This Article is about family trust companies and the way they are used
by very wealthy families to preserve great fortunes. A family trust
company is a corporation formed to provide fiduciary services to a
single family or related group of people, in contrast to banking
institutions established to offer similar services to a larger public. The
province of the mega-rich (who remain very much upon the American
landscape, the recent economic crisis notwithstanding2), the family
trust company is generally thought to be a vehicle for families with a
net worth of at least $200 million.3 While the family trust company has
long been important in securing the fortunes of some of the nation’s
wealthiest families, scant attention has been paid to it by the academic
bar. This Article aims to redress this longstanding oversight, especially
in light of recent changes in the law that make these entities far more
accessible to the very wealthy.
Family trust companies are not new in the U.S., but first appeared in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the wake of the
Gilded Age, when a few of the nation’s wealthiest families created
*

Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. J.D., New York University School of Law,
Ph.D., Columbia University.
1
SIMON HALL, THE HUTCHESON ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BRITISH HISTORY 147 (Paul Davis ed.,
Taylor and Francis 1999).
2
While the recent economic crisis has been consequential for the very rich (as for everyone else) and many
great fortunes currently reflect the decline in the market, many of the America’s wealthiest families remain
among the nation’s – and the world’s -- most financially fortunate people. “The rich haven’t gotten richer –
or poorer – this year.” See Forbes 400, http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/16/richest-american-billionaireslists-400list08-cx_mm_dg_0917richintro.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
3
Pierce H. McDowell III, Family Owned Private Trust Companies, ABA TRUSTS AND INVESTMENTS, MayJune, 2008 at 44..

1

them.4 The family trust companies of this earlier era were usually
organized under the same laws and regulatory requirements that would
govern any state-chartered trust company serving the public. Recently,
however, following upon the economic boom of the last twenty-five
years (what some have dubbed America’s “Second Gilded Age”5), the
law in some states has become much more accommodating, making
these entities far easier to create and to operate – much more accessible
to wealthy families looking to preserve their fortunes far into the
future.6 But to appreciate the significance of the family trust company,
we must not only attend to the particulars of recent laws that so
effectively facilitate establishment of these entities. We must also
examine this entity in situ, as the very wealthy employ it, as the
masterstroke in a series of aggressive planning techniques – tax-driven
and otherwise -- that potentially secure and indeed grow a fortune for
untold generations to come.
Great fortunes tend to dissipate for a number of reasons. The most
obvious source of pressure (or so it would seem) emanates from the
federal wealth transfer tax regime -- of which the estate tax is the
principle tax. This tax was enacted for the precise purpose of ensuring
the exhaustion of great fortunes within a few generations.7 Be this as it
may, however, the estate tax is now and has been from its inception a
voluntary tax – at least for the very rich.8 While the transfer tax regime
has continued to evolve and indeed over time has become more
exacting in its demands, in every era the very rich and those that advise
them in the intergenerational transfer of assets have responded with
4

Some of these are still around and now, in addition to serving multiple generations of the founding family,
they have opened their doors to the public. See, e.g., RICHARD R. DAVIS, THE PHIPPS FAMILY AND THE
BESSEMER COMPANIES 76 (Turner Publishing Company 2007).
5
Ronald D. Aucutt, The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust Companies and Family Offices (March 8 & 9,
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Iris Goodwin of the University of Tennessee College of Law).
6
Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 690-91 available at SP020
ALI-ABA 675.
7
See, CAMPFIELD, DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 22 (23d ed. West
Group 2006)
8
James Casner, noting the extraordinary effectiveness of generation-skipping transfers in circumventing
the transfer tax regime, remarked to the House Ways and Means Committee, “[i]n fact, we haven’t got an
estate tax, what we have, you pay an estate tax if you want to; it you don’t want to, you don’t have to.”
Estate and Gift Taxes: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. Pt 2, 1335 (Mar.
15-23, 1976) (statement of Professor A. James Casner). See also Edward J. McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax?
Revisited
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at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269352; George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New
Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161(1977). This point obtains,
notwithstanding recent populist lamentations about the “death taxes.” Thus, while there is no doubt that the
advent of the Obama administration and the Democratic majority in both Houses of Congress has restored
the infamous tax to the political terra firma,8 for the super-wealthy this sea-change in Washington makes
for little moment. Jonathan Weisman, Obama Plans to Keep Estate Tax Democrats Want to Freeze Levy at
Current Levels WALL STREET JOURNAL, January 12, 2009 at A1. The privately-owned, family-operated,
family trust company
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ever more complex techniques to minimize the burden of this tax.
Whatever the era, however, such strategies must be employed unless
the tax is to exert its dissipating force. Our era is no different and, in
fact, can be distinguished only by the sophistication of the more
popular strategies and the magnitude of their ambition – and by their
frequent reliance upon the privately-owned, family-operated, family
trust company as their crowning implement.
But in our era, not only does the family trust company play a role in
various tax-planning strategies that minimize the pressure of the federal
fisc, but these entities are also established as a bulwark against other
important but less obvious sources of pressure on great wealth. The
very wealthy and their advisers have long been aware that other
powerful, dissipative forces are in play with respect to great fortunes.
Indeed, these forces are so significant that in the face of them the
benefits of sophisticated tax planning can be reduced to naught in short
order. In these other battlegrounds in securing the wealthy in their
privilege, attention has come to center on what happens to great
fortunes after they have been transferred into trust (often done as part
of a strategy to shelter wealth from the transfer tax regime). The
transfer of wealth into trusts benefiting successive generations of the
family (with the location of control outside the family9) has in and of
itself augured a diminution in fortunes over time. There is an old joke
among trust beneficiaries: “How do you make a small fortune? Give a
bank a large one to manage in trust!”10
The super-wealthy of today, particularly those who earned their
fortunes in the economic boom of the last twenty years, believe that
important among the reasons that great fortunes dissipate is that large
banking institutions manage money too conservatively, especially
money in trust.11 Whatever the era, the fundamental reason that a
super-rich family forms a family trust company is the desire to invest
its own wealth, even after (for reasons of transfer tax planning) it has
been transferred into trust.12 This was the case in earlier times,13 but it
is especially so today. These families are now prepared to make their
own determination of risk, even if their wealth is in trust, bringing an
9

There are many legal reasons to name a third-party as trustee. For example, naming the donor of the trust
is trustee limits the discretion the trustee can be granted unless the transfer is to run afoul of a number of
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code applicable to transfers in trust that will cause inclusion of the trust
in the donor’s estate. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) (2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.2036 (2007).
10
Jesse Dukeminier & James F. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2003)
1335.
11
See, Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the Next Millennium
Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at 68.
12
Pierce H. McDowell III, Family Owned Private Trust Companies, ABA TRUSTS AND INVESTMENTS,
May-June, 2008 at 43-44.
13
See, e.g., RICHARD R. DAVIS, THE PHIPPS FAMILY AND THE BESSEMER COMPANIES 59-60 (Turner
Publishing Company 2007).
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entrepreneurial mindset to bear on their funds. The same mindset that
they believe was essential to the creation of their fortunes is the
mindset they believe can maintain those fortunes.14 The problem has
been getting into the driver’s seat and it is here that the family trust
company appeals.
Until about twenty years ago, the law of fiduciary duty would not have
readily encompassed an entrepreneurial mindset with respect to
investing funds in trust, whoever was in the driver’s seat. If banking
institutions managed money conservatively, this posture was consonant
with the law.15 About twenty years ago, however, the law governing
the investment of trust assets began to change and it is this change in
the law that wealthy families intend to exploit to the fullest once their
wealth is in trust and the family trust company is at the helm.16 In our
era, determination of the risk profile appropriate to any portfolio has
become (consistent with the law) as much an art as a science and is
ultimately governed by the totality of facts and circumstances
surrounding the account. This means that, if the account is large
enough and the horizon long enough, even highly speculative
investments such as venture capital and private equity can become
appropriate investments for property in trust.17
But size does matter. Even under the new standard of care, an
aggressive investment strategy must be justified, and a very large
corpus in a long-term trust can justify taking a greater degree of risk in
investing the account. Here is the point where the advanced planning
techniques permitting a wealthy family to transfer tens of millions of
dollars into trust with little to no transfer tax liability (either at the
creation of the trust when property is transferred or later as assets still
in trust serve successive generations of the family) become truly
important. The family trust company is then established not simply to
implement various tax-planning strategies or to secure their benefits,
but to exploit those benefits to justify an aggressive investment posture
consonant with the law. Without the drain upon family funds (and the
dissipating pressure) that the transfer tax burden would otherwise
constitute, much of the family fortune can be transferred into trust in
tact, justifying an aggressive investment strategy once the funds are
held there. Then, with a sufficiently entrepreneurial spirit at the helm,
the new standard of care makes it possible to do with property in trust

14

Pierce H. McDowell III, Family Owned Private Trust Companies, ABA TRUSTS AND INVESTMENTS,
May-June, 2008 at 43-44.
15
See infra,
16
See, infra,
17
See infra,
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what has rarely been done before18 -- and potentially great fortunes do
not merely cease to wane, but can actually appreciate.
Whatever control of investing a family may garner by establishing a
family trust company, however, this control will be useless if the family
cannot muster from generation to generation from within its ranks the
financial acumen and expertise and indeed the discipline to make stateof-the-art investment decisions. Interestingly, as part of the effort to
end what some advisors have termed “financial entropy” within
wealthy families, there has emerged a literature offering guidance in
“financial parenting” so that wealthy children come of age free of the
self-indulgence and accompanying desuetude that is said to commonly
characterize the lives of second- and third-generation members of such
families.19 Such character flaws (so this literature claims) ensure that,
strategies to minimize the toll of the transfer tax regime
notwithstanding, great fortunes are soon lost, lending truth to the
proverb “shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations.”20 According
to this literature, the antidote lies in the cultivation across generations
of attitudes about money, investing and risk, with the intent of fostering
an awareness not only of the magnitude of their privilege but also its
financial underpinnings.21
And here again, in this “financial parenting,” the family trust company
enters to play an instrumental role. If the operation of a family trust
company requires certain skills and attitudes, the trust company itself
(so this literature observes) can serve as a forum in which education in
these skills and attitudes can take place. Senior executives (the older
generation) can school junior executives (the younger generation) in the
course of making investment decisions. But further, within the
framework of the family trust company, families are encouraged to
recruit outside experts, from financial sages to psychologists, to hold
seminars for family members about wealth -- even about “feelings”

18

See, e.g., RICHARD R. DAVIS, THE PHIPPS FAMILY AND THE BESSEMER COMPANIES 81-104 (Turner
Publishing Company 2007).
19
See JESSIE O’NEILL, THE GOLDEN GHETTO: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AFFLUENCE (Affluenza Project 1997).
Ms. O’Neil was the granddaughter of the former president of GM. Drawing upon her own experience, she
developed the term “affluenza” as a summary reference to the flaws often developed by children of the very
wealthy. See also, Linda C. McClain, Family Constitutions and the (New) Constitution of the Family, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 861 (2006); Pierce H. McDowell III, Family Owned Private Trust Companies,
ABA TRUSTS AND INVESTMENTS, May-June, 2008 at 43-44.
20
JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY WEALTH -- KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY: HOW FAMILY MEMBERS AND
THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS 3 (rev. ed.
Bloomberg Press 2004)
21
JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY WEALTH -- KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY: HOW FAMILY MEMBERS AND
THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS 116-18
(rev. ed. Bloomburg Press 2004).
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about being wealthy – all with the object of thwarting financial
entropy.22
Finally, the family trust company and its applications in the
perpetuation of great fortunes bear normative implications that any
treatment of this entity should not overlook. It has long been a
commonplace of democratic theory that, while democracy is largely
immune to some degree of material difference within a polity,
intransigent, radical differences in means are problematic.23 For this
reason, the dissipation of great fortunes has been viewed as salubrious
in a democratic polity.24 “Shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three (or so)
generations” is more than a proverb; it is an operating condition of a
healthy democracy.25
For many theorists of democracy, the virtually tax-free transmission of
wealth from generation to generation within wealthy families has not
been deemed politically or socially consequential, however, because
there has been a failsafe: fortunes are quite precarious, whatever their
size, as they dissipate in the ordinary course (even if they escape tax as
they move between generations).26 If great fortunes do indeed dissipate
in the ordinary course, then, where democracy is concerned, the
effectively voluntary nature of the estate tax is seemingly less
consequential – provided that fortunes do in fact dissipate. If the
family trust company succeeds where advisers claim it can, however,
the financial entropy that has been thought to inhere in great fortunes –
and to be at least a background condition of a thriving democracy -will be a thing of the past.
In this regard it is worth returning to uses of the family trust company
in financial “financial parenting” to make one additional preliminary
observation. As wealthy families are encouraged to gather within the
family trust company in order to embrace their privilege selfconsciously, thereby to eliminate the precarious nature of their fortune,
22

JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY WEALTH -- KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY: HOW FAMILY MEMBERS AND
THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS 116-18
(rev. ed. Bloomburg Press 2004).
23
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 at 44 (Liberty Fund ed., George W. Carey & James McClellan eds. 2001).
24
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971). Rawls defends inheritance taxes “not to raise
revenue….but gradually and continually to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations
of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity.“
25
See, e.g., Alexis De Tocqueville, Introduction to Volume One and Part 3 Section 3 “Social State of the
Anglo-Americans” in ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, pp. 50 (Anchor Books, 1969)
(1835). See also B. Douglas Bernheim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue? in 1 TAX POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 113, 121-32 (Lawrence J. Summers ed. 1987); Michael J. Boskin, An Economist’s Perspective
on Estate Taxation. in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT
at 65 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr., ed. 1977); and Gary Solon, Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United
States 82 AM. ECON. REV. 393-398, 403-05 (1992).
26
Michael J. Boskin, An Economist’s Perspective on Estate Taxation. in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 65-66 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr., ed. 1977).
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they potentially secure themselves in a world apart – precisely what the
wealth transfer tax was meant to preclude.27 The sustained process of
gathering together within the family trust company for the purpose of
preserving and growing wealth encourages these families to discern and
indeed embrace the special circumstances – and privileges -- of great
wealth, for the precise purpose of securing them into the future. The
family trust company is designed to be privilege-sustaining, indeed
privilege-enhancing.
One last point: In the wake of the recent economic turmoil, we might
think that anyone with an entrepreneurial mindset would feel
chastened, particularly given that many speculators have suffered
enormous losses and speculative excess is what – so many say -- has
brought the U.S. economy to its knees. And the many of the wealthy
have seen a decline in the value of their holdings like everyone else.
Be this as it may, however, with pundits disagreeing about the
effectiveness of various antidotes to the crisis and no one confidently
auguring the light at the end of the tunnel, the time could not be riper
for the wealthy to want to manage their own risk, to protect against
further downside as well as to position portfolios to take advantage of
early opportunities that will appear when the U.S. economy starts to
recover.28 And this is no less the case where the property is held in
trust.
Part I of this Article examines those recent changes in the laws in some
states that allow for ease of set up and operation of a trust company
serving a related group of people. This Part sets the stage for
appreciating the role that these entities potentially play in forestalling
the erosion of great fortunes.
Part II recognizes that size matters in justifying fiduciary investment
decisions and provides an overview of the valuation alchemy
commonly brought to bear on great fortunes as they are being
transferred into perpetual trusts. Among other strategies, we consider
the “Note-Sale,” a strategy commonly employed to transfer enormous
wealth into trust with virtually no transfer tax liability. If size matters
in justifying investment decisions under the Prudent Investor standard,
then these strategies for transferring wealth with little to no tax
consequence are crucial to empowering the trustee to invest some
portion of the trust corpus aggressively.

27

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971).
Indeed, for many very wealthy people this economic crisis represents an opportunity of sorts. With asset
values reduced, assets may be transferred within the family at substantially reduced value transfer tax costs.
See, Deborah L. Jacobs, As Economy Declines, Donors Rethink Estate Planning, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov.
11, 2008 at F 27.

28
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Part III treats the Prudent Investor statute and the opportunity it has
created under the law to grow assets in trust if other circumstances are
congenial and an entrepreneurial mindset is at the helm in the capacity
of fiduciary.
Part IV explores the use of the family trust company as a platform by
which to cultivate within the family financial expertise and attitudes
concerning money calculated to end financial entropy and secure a
family in its privilege for generations to come.
I. The Modern Family Trust Company
Continuing to invest the family fortune after it has been transferred into
trust has long held significant appeal for wealthy families and, for well
over a century, family trust companies have been used as a means to
that end. Family trust companies first appeared in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Then they were organized as statechartered and state-regulated banks under the same laws and regulatory
requirements that would govern any state-chartered trust company
serving the public.29 In our era, a family trust company can still be
organized this way,30 but recent changes in the law (at least in some
states) make this unnecessary.
a. The new regulatory regimes. While a wealthy family can still create
a national bank (regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency) or a state bank (regulated by state banking authorities), it is
now possible to create an unregulated or a “lightly regulated” trust
company, if the entity is limited in its purpose to serving as trustee of
trusts31 benefiting a group of related people.32 In one group of states,
29

In fact, a number of these earlier family trust companies have grown into banking institutions that serve a
larger public. Created to serve the family of Henry Phipps, Bessemer Trust opened its doors to the public
in 1972. See Bessemer Trust, https://www.bessemer.com/portal/site/bessemernew/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2009). Pitcairn Family Office was established to manage the fortune of the descendants of John Pitcairn,
co-founder of what is now PPG Industries. The firm opened its doors to other wealthy families in 1987,
providing (among other financial services) fiduciary services. See Pitcairn Family Office,
http://www.pitcairn.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). Rockefeller Trust was established 125 years ago by
John D. Rockefeller to manage money for his descendants. See Rockefeller, http://www.rockco.com/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2009).
30
The entity is unlikely to be organized as a national bank or a state bank, unless the family plans to open a
business effectively and to take deposits and offer other conventional banking services. See Carol
Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate Planner
Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 689 available at SP020 ALI-ABA
675.
31
Family trust companies also serve as executors of the estates of family members. See Carol Harrington
& Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate Planner Needs to
Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 689 available at SP020 ALI-ABA 675.
32
Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 689 available at SP020
ALI-ABA 675. Interestingly, states do not always specify what is meant by the requirement of a “related
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legislatures have responded with new and separate private trust
company charters, so that trust companies serving only a related group
of people can be subject to “lighter” requirements than those imposed
on trust companies serving the general public.33 In certain other states,
liberalization of the law has occurred by simply allowing a limited
purpose corporation to act as a trust company under the general statutes
of the state.34 Some states make available both options – light
regulation or no regulation.35 Whichever scheme a family elects, these
innovations at the state level have reduced the costs of formation and
operation for these new entities.
(i) The “lightly regulated” family trust company. The “lightly
regulated” family trust company is still chartered by the state and
subject to state supervision, although not on a level comparable to a
bank or trust company serving the general public, provided the
organizing documents limit the purpose of the entity to the provision of
fiduciary services to members of a family or a group of related people
and, further, prohibit the trust company from soliciting business from
the public at large.36 Even a so-called “lightly” regulated family trust
company will usually have to have a minimum number of directors37
(and perhaps with one or more directors resident in the state), a
minimum number of board meetings per year38, a physical office in the
state39, and a minimum number of employees.40 Further, there must be
group of people.” See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-1 (2007). But see NEV. REV. STAT. §
669.02(1)(b) (YEAR); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392:40-a(I)(a) (2006).
33
States permitting a “lightly regulated” family trust company include Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§
773, 774, 779 (2001), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.40-a, 392.40-b (2006)); South
Dakota and Alaska.
34
States permitting an unregulated family trust company include Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-32.1
(1999)).
35
States allowing both include Massachusetts, Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 669.080(1)(o)).and Wyoming.
36
With respect to family trust companies, especially where unregulated but even where lightly regulated at
the state level, some advisors have been concerned that these entities could be subject to registration with
the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Because these
entities offer trustee services (and with this investment advice), some advisors have worried that they were
potentially subject to the 1940 Act. And in that they are not regulated by state banking regulators to any
meaningful degree, they would not qualify under the “bank” exemption there. This would mean that, while
changes in state law would exempt these entities from one form of regulation (state banking regulation), by
exempting them from this regulation they would be subjected to another regulation (1940 Act). See. e.g.,
Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 694 available at SP020
ALI-ABA 675. In 2007, upon the representation that the family trust company organized as a limited
liability company under Wyoming law did not hold itself out to the public as an investment adviser, the
SEC issued an order of exemption under Section 202(a)(11)(F) of the Advisers Act. See Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 2599, March 20, 2007.
37
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 669.080(1)(o), 661.135 (YEAR); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392:40-a(II), 384:3(IV)
(2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-13 (2007).
38
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 669.080(1)(o), 661.165 (YEAR); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.40-a(II), 384:7
(2006) S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-15 (2007).
39
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 669.080(1)(o), 660.015(1) (YEAR); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-58 (2007).
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in place a formalized risk-management discipline, which will be
periodically reviewed by state regulators. This discipline can include
bylaws, a policy manual (setting forth, among other things, a committee
structure and decision rules for those committees), annual reports41, and
appropriate record-keeping42. Capital requirements vary state by state
but are universally modest (with some states as low as $200,00043 and
others up to $2 million44). Some states imposing lighter capital
requirements (e.g., South Dakota and New Hampshire) also require a
surety bond of $1 million.45
(ii) The unregulated trust company. Some states offer an even more
liberal regime, however. In these states a state-issued charter is not
required to establish a family trust company nor will be the state
exercise subsequent regulatory oversight.46 States that allow family
trust companies to form without any regulation typically permit the
family to create a limited purpose corporation that then acts as a trust
company under the general statutes of the state. The organizing
documents (as was the case with the lightly regulated regime) must
limit the purpose of the entity to the provision of fiduciary services to
members of a family and, further, prohibit the trust company from
soliciting business from the public at large. For entities organized
under these regimes, there are usually no capital requirements. The
simpler procedures for organization, the absence of periodic
examinations, and the absence of capital requirements allow a family
trust company to be quickly and easily established and make it less
expensive to operate.47
b. Organizing the Family Trust Company: Type of Association and
Where Located? Creation of a family trust company begins with a
determination as to the type of business association and the governing
structure of this entity. The family must also decide the state in which
the family trust company will be organized and operated. These
decisions are crucial if the family is to realize the potential of the
40

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 51A-6A-31 to -32 (2007). For example, in South Dakota, the requisite minimum
number of employees is one and state examinations occur only every eighteen months. See also NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 669.080(1)(o), 669.110, 665.135(2) (YEAR).
41
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 669.080(1)(o), 669.110, 665.105 (YEAR); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.40-b
(2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-34 (2007).
42
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-30 (2007).
43
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 779, 745 (2001).
44
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.40-a(II), 392.25(I) (YEAR); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-19 (2007).
45
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-19 (2007). See also Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust
Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING
EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 709 available at SP020 ALI-ABA 675.
46
E.g., Massachusetts, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wyoming. The Virginia statute only authorizes
an unregulated private trust company. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-32.1 (1999).
47
Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 690-91 available at SP020
ALI-ABA 675.
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family trust company, first as a significant component within an
advanced tax planning strategy and later as a vehicle by which to
secure the family fortune into the future.
(i) Organization and Governance. A variety of considerations can drive
this decision as to the type of business entity to be used. Since states
that have liberalized their laws with respect to the formation of family
trust companies usually permit these to be organized as limited liability
companies, most families will organize as a limited liability company,
although some still form a corporation.48 To take advantage of those
state statutes that have recently liberalized the regulatory framework
applicable to family trust companies, the entity is typically organized
for the limited purpose of providing trust services to a particular family
or group of related individuals.49
Once a decision is made with respect to the type of business association
to be used, the family must put in place a governance structure so that
the family can, through the various administrative arms of the trust
company, effectively control the investment of trust funds (among
other things) .50 The ownership interest is usually vested in individual
family members.51 Family members also serve on the board of
directors.
The board can also include outside advisors of
longstanding.52 To the extent that the applicable state statute requires
that one or more directors be resident in the state where the trust
company has been created and where it will operate, local attorneys and
other advisers can be named. In all events, however, states that permit
48

A partnership would not be used because the entity would terminate when one of the partners died. This
would defeat one of the purposes of creating an entity to serve as trustee rather than relying upon an
individual.
49
Ronald D. Aucutt, The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust Companies and Family Offices (March 8 & 9,
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Iris Goodwin of the University of Tennessee College of Law).
50
While control of investing the trust corpus rarely has adverse tax consequences for the family, control of
distributions of income or principal by family members to family members can have disastrous transfer tax
consequences. Because the desire to control of distributions is usually not the primary reason that a family
establishes a family trust company, decision-making within the family trust company can usually be
structured so that adverse tax consequences. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-31 I.R.B. 261.
51
Trusts established for the benefit of family members can also hold some or all of the ownership interest
in a family trust company – a further step that, among other things, removes the ownership interest from
family members’ estates. Indeed, it is not uncommon for the trusts for which the family trust company is
the trustee to own the family trust company. This circularity may appear to present questions with respect
to fiduciary duty and enforceability, as this structure renders the beneficiaries themselves, though their
beneficial interests in the trust, economically identical to the trustee. While there are elements of irony
here, however, in truth the situation is not fundamentally different from the situation where individual
family members are the trustees of trusts benefiting the family. See Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding,
Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA
CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 694 available at SP020 ALI-ABA 675.; Ronald D. Aucutt,
The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust Companies and Family Offices (March 8 & 9, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Iris Goodwin of the University of Tennsee College of Law).
52
Ronald D. Aucutt, The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust Companies and Family Offices (March 8 & 9,
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Iris Goodwin of the University of Tennsee College of Law).
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a family to create a lightly-regulated or unregulated family trust
company also permit the family to control the board, the necessary
presence of others notwithstanding.
ii. Caveat: Liability. For the family that objects to bureaucratic redtape, the unregulated family trust company has appeal, at least at first
glance. Ease of formation and operation notwithstanding, however, a
reason for creating a family trust company is to overcome one of the
drawbacks in naming an individual as trustee – that is, the personal
liability of the trustee. If the trustee is organized as a corporation or a
limited liability company, then the trustee’s liability should be limited
to the amount of any required formation capital and the value of any
surety bond. So, for example, in South Dakota where capital in the
amount of $200,000 is required for formation along with a $1 million
surety bond, liability would be limited to $1.2 million. This is the case,
however, unless the corporate veil is pierced. If this occurs, then those
members of the family deemed the principals are potentially liable.53
Thus, even a family that dislikes red-tape may decide that some degree
of regulation and such organizational niceties as bylaws, a policy
manual, a committee structure with formalized decision-making
processes, and good record-keeping lend a crucial element to the entity,
that is, organizational integrity.54
iii. Trust Company State Situs. Because not every state allows a
family to establish a modern family trust company, obviously the entity
must be organized and operated in a state where the law has been
liberalized, unless, of course, the entity is to be organized under one of
the legal regimes governing those trust companies serving the public.55
The state in which the trust company is organized and operated is
important for other reasons as well, however. The situs of the trust
company will also supply the situs and governing law for any trusts
established by the family where the trust company is named as

53

Of course, the beneficiaries suing for breach of trust will be the children, siblings, cousins, nieces and
nephews of those serving in a decision-making capacity in the trust. Suffice it to note that this can happen.
54
DON KOZUSKO, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES, OPEN-ARCHITECTURE TRUSTS, FAMILY OFFICES, TRUST
PROTECTORS AND ADVISORS: WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PLAIN OLD TRUSTEE, OCTOBER 17-18 (2007);
Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 693 available at SP020
ALI-ABA 675.
55
In fact, a number of these earlier family trust companies have grown into banking institutions that serve a
larger public. Created to serve the family of Henry Phipps, Bessemer Trust opened its doors to the public
in 1972. See Bessemer Trust, https://www.bessemer.com/portal/site/bessemernew/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2009). Pitcairn Family Office was established to manage the fortune of the descendants of John Pitcairn,
co-founder of what is now PPG Industries. The firm opened its doors to other wealthy families in 1987,
providing (among other financial services) fiduciary services. See Pitcairn Family Office,
http://www.pitcairn.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). Rockefeller Trust was established 125 years ago by
John D. Rockefeller to manage money for his descendants. See Rockefeller, http://www.rockco.com/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2009).

12

trustee.56 If the family trust company is to be the masterstroke in a
sophisticated estate plan, it is also crucial that it be located in a state
where the law is optimal for the realization of all aspects of the plan.
Fortunately, for the families undertaking these complex estate plans,
many of the states that have liberalized their laws with respect to
forming privately owned, family trust companies have also changed
their laws governing the creation and administration of trusts to make
them attractive to those looking to place significant wealth in trust with
their own trust company as trustee.57
d. Alternative Fiduciaries – “Big Banks” and Private Individuals.
Families of extraordinary wealth would almost always58 be welcome
clients of existing banks and trust companies – those that, for a fee,
readily serve as fiduciary for members of the public. Or, in the
alternative, these families could avoid using a big bank by naming an
individual as trustee, either a person expert in fiduciary matters (e.g.,
a lawyer specializing in trusts and estates) or someone without
professional expertise, perhaps a family member. Either of these
choices would allow a family to avoid the burdens of establishing and
then operating a trust company of its own. Both a big bank trustee
and an individual fiduciary have significant limitations for people
with considerable wealth who want to provide for multiple
generations of their families by transferring this property into longterm trusts.
(i) “Big Banks.” Big banks now typically offer their wealthier clients
state-of-the-art estate planning assistance, along with structures and
services consonant with changes in the law particularly attractive to the
very wealthy eager to transfer their property into trust. For example,
these institutions now commonly have subsidiaries in states that allow
for the creation of perpetual trusts. Further, consistent with the prudent
investor statute, these institutions often offer a platform of cutting-edge
investments appropriate to the risk-profile of large privately-held
fortunes, even those in trust.

56

The situs of the trust company will supply the situs for any trust for which the family trust company or
some other trustee (banking institution or resident individual) in the state is the original trustee.
57
That is, trusts that name the family trust company as the initial trustee. Trusts for which the family trust
company is successor trustee are another question. The family trust company cannot create nexus with
respect to all important legal issues for a trust that names as initial trustee a person domiciled in another
jurisdiction or another trust company located in another jurisdiction.
58
Certain banks and conventional trust companies are reluctant to accept in trust volatile or hard-to-manage
assets such as real estate, operating companies, or a non-diversified portfolio consisting in an ownership
interest in either a closely-held company or a publicly-traded one where the family does not want the
portfolio diversified. See Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family
Offices: What Every Estate Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at
689 available at SP020 ALI-ABA 675.
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For families establishing privately owned, family trust companies,
however, these available structures and services are not enough. With
respect to state situs, for example, not only is the possibility of
establishing a perpetual trust at issue for these families, but there are
other provisions of state law that can also be advantageous in
establishing a trust. One state may allow perpetual trusts, but another
may allow these plus have a more attractive law with respect to asset
protection. Prudent Investor statutes also vary state by state. In
establishing a trust, these families want to elect the state situs that is
optimal for them, not one determined by a large institution to be
optimal for its client-base.
And with respect to investments, notwithstanding any platform of
sophisticated vehicles offered by existing banks and trust companies,
these families want to continue to invest their property, even after it has
been placed in trust. Prudent investor notwithstanding, a trustee has a
duty not only to invest but to conserve the assets of the trust in
accordance with statutorily mandated fiduciary standards.
Any
investment program subject to fiduciary standards is to look to the
interests of income beneficiaries and remaindermen, both born and
unborn.59 This is a tall order and a big-bank trustee is mindful that, for
any risk profile established by a it, the standard of review looks to
common fiduciary investment practice.60 This means that banks and
trust companies serving the larger public are generally loathe to invest
an account more aggressively than they anticipate their competitors
would invest, given the risk profile. Also, while trustees are not
required to guarantee results as they invest a trust portfolio, the duty of
care encourages these institutions to attend to deliberative processes
carefully recorded, as a prudent process is usually a good defense to a
bad result.
There are opportunity costs, however, attendant upon convening
committees and reaching decisions in accordance with procedural
dictates and there are those that believe such tentativeness to be
ultimately unproductive, especially where the account is of significant
size and the time horizon is that of the perpetual trust. Many families
establishing privately owned, family trust companies want to be free of
such constraints. These families are seeking to ensure full exploitation
of any prudent investor statute by developing their own, more nuanced
risk-profile to govern investment decisions for their property placed in
59

Suzanne M. Trimble, Lilfe’s Hard Choices” Why Choose a Corporate Trustee?, 14-SEP CBA Rec. 44
(2000). See also David S. Prince, Sutton’s Law and Economic Applied to the Professional Fiduciary:
Helping the Trustees to avoid Predatory Litigants, 119 BANKING L.J. 17 (2002).
60
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 657 (1995). The
standard of prudent investing has been the standard of industry practice – what other trustees similarly
situated were doing. See also John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 644 (1996).
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trust and want, where possible, to be free of bureaucratic red-tape so
that they can turn on a dime in making investment decisions.61 In short,
these families are seeking to exploit prudent investor to the max. They
want a trustee that is willing and able to facilitate the realization of
goals consistent with their own risk-assessment.
(ii) Alternatives – Individual Trustees. Of course, these families could
avoid using a big bank by naming an individual as trustee, either a
person expert in fiduciary matters (e.g., a lawyer specializing in trusts
and estates) or someone without professional expertise, perhaps a
family member. But to the extent that these families are seeking to
establish their trusts in a state with statutes optimally advantageous for
their particular purposes, an individual – expert or otherwise – cannot
provide the nexus necessary to create situs unless he or she is domiciled
in the desired state.62 Further, even if an appropriate individual can be
located in the desired state, individuals go on vacation, become
incapacitated, die and resign.63 This fact is usually of modest moment
in a garden-variety trust, one of moderate size, established to last one or
two lifetimes. In the case of a perpetual trust holding a fortune in
cutting-edge investments, however, such limitations can be
consequential indeed. If an individual trustee is contemplated, what
will be needed (vacations notwithstanding) is an unbroken line of
succession from one honest, experienced, informed and ideally astute
individual to the next, each residing in the appropriate jurisdiction.
And ultimately, this succession of individual fiduciaries must
potentially serve with respect to multiple trusts, all with slightly
different rationales.
Further, given the complexity of the provisions in a typical perpetual
trust and the challenges that inhere in investing a portfolio of great size,
an individual trustee (even a person with professional expertise) must
commonly resort to a bank or other financial services provider (or a
collection of providers) to serve as agent for the trustee in any number
of capacities.64 This does not mean that the individual trustee will
delegate fiduciary responsibility as he or she always retains a duty to
61

And to the extent a big bank might be willing to look beyond its own investment platform to
accommodate a particular family’s investment interest, any investment direction would still be subject to
the bank’s deliberative process – red-tape that these families want to avoid.
62
Certain objections to big banks can be overcome by naming an individual as co-trustee and assigning this
person certain responsibilities, making the bank a “delegated” or “directed” trustee. This alternative can
have consequences of its own, however, as some states tax the income earned by trusts according to where
the individual trustees reside. See DON KOZUSKO, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES, OPEN-ARCHITECTURE
TRUSTS, FAMILY OFFICES, TRUST PROTECTORS AND ADVISORS: WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PLAIN OLD
TRUSTEE, 22 2007.
63
Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust Companies and Family
Offices, ACTEC Annual Meeting, March 8 & 9, 2008, Seminar G, SEMG-13-CAH.
64
DON KOZUSKO, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES, OPEN-ARCHITECTURE TRUSTS, FAMILY OFFICES, TRUST
PROTECTORS AND ADVISORS: WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PLAIN OLD TRUSTEE, 16-17 October, 2007.
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monitor an agent’s performance.65 Nevertheless, when an individual
trustee is named to serve alone, investment advice, custody and
sometimes even record-keeping and tax return preparation are
commonly contracted out to large corporate institutions.66
Finally, trustees are personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty –
something that is always of concern but is of particular moment here
where the plan contemplates a relatively aggressive posture on the part
of the fiduciary with respect to investments. Many families in naming
an individual as trustee will attempt to redress this vulnerability by
including an indemnification provision in the trust instrument,
especially since individual trustees often find insurance coverage
limited or unavailable.67 Under current law, however, the legal force of
such indemnifications is uncertain, with many commentators arguing
that, to bind, these must be limited in the trust agreement to particular
assets or specified situations.68 In addition, the intractable problem of
personal liability here makes for yet another obstacle to finding
individuals willing to serve as trustee, not only initially but
successively. In contrast, the liabilities of a family trust company (and
of any employee serving there) are more easily managed.69
A family trust company can avoid the perceived opportunity costs
inherent in the use of a big bank as trustee as well as other limitations
(including potential liability) attendant upon naming an individual. The
family trust company (itself a corporate entity) then becomes an
attractive alternative, blending the structural advantages of a corporate
trustee with the discretionary latitude of an individual one.70

Part II: Valuation Alchemy: Creating the Trust Corpus
To justify an aggressive posture under Prudent Investor, the trustee
must look to the totality of facts and circumstances surrounding the
trust, and the case for investing aggressively is better made where the
corpus is considerable and the term of the trust, extended. Strategies
for transferring the family fortune into trust with little to no transfer tax
65

Iris J. Goodwin, Delegation of Fiduciary Investment Responsibility: Trustees Explore the Once Taboo,
TRUSTS & ESTATES, Mar, 1999.
66
Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 689 available at SP020
ALI-ABA 675.
67
DON KOZUSKO, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES, OPEN-ARCHITECTURE TRUSTS, FAMILY OFFICES, TRUST
PROTECTORS AND ADVISORS: WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PLAIN OLD TRUSTEE, 19 October, 2007.
68
E.g., Melanie Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense, Fiduciary Standards and Trustee Liability, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2713 at 2728 (2006).
69
Supra,
70
DON KOZUSKO, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES, OPEN-ARCHITECTURE TRUSTS, FAMILY OFFICES, TRUST
PROTECTORS AND ADVISORS: WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PLAIN OLD TRUSTEE, 17-18 October, 2007.
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liability then constitute an important prelude to the exercise of fiduciary
investment discretion in ways that the family wants, because any tax
paid is likely to reduce the funds that ultimately find their way into
trust. Also important for minimizing the overall tax burden on a family
fortune is placing funds in a trust of extended duration. In this section
we consider the advantages of establishing a long-term trust and
examine one particularly powerful strategy for transferring funds to it
with little to no transfer tax liability – the Note-Sale. If the Note-Sale is
not adequate to shelter the family fortune, other strategies can be
brought to bear on what remains – among the more popular being the
“zero-ed out GRAT.” These various techniques make possible the
transfer into perpetual trust of what is effectively tens of millions of
dollars without the family ever having to pay transfer tax.
a. The Long-Term Trust. To take a step back, the need to invest
subject to the Prudent Investor standard would not arise but for the
family fortune being in trust. If the members of family held family
assets outright, then each generation of the family (as it came into its
inheritance) would be free to invest – and indeed to risk -- the funds as
it saw fit. The question that occurs then is why, for a very wealthy
family eager to minimize its transfer tax burden, property is likely to be
transferred into trust.
The simple transfer-tax reason71 that wealthy families put their
fortunes into trust is that only the initial transfer into trust – the
transfer in fee simple from the donor to the trustee – is subject to
transfer tax. And this is the case, even though multiple, successive
generations of the family subsequently benefit from the property (as
equitable owners). In contrast, if the family fortune were transferred
outright from parent to child and then from child to grandchild, and so
on, each of the transfers (all in fee simple) would trigger a tax. Taken
together, the multiple instances of taxation as property descended
from one family member to another, generation to generation, would
make for a great drain on the family fortune. But if the property is
transferred into trust, it is not subject to transfer tax again until the
trust terminates and the property goes outright to the beneficiaries
(termed “remaindermen”). Only after the trust terminates, when those
remaindermen (now holding the property outright and free of trust)
choose to transfer the property, will the property again be subject to

71

Placing assets in trust can also protect them from beneficiaries’ creditors as, generally, credits of a trust
beneficiary can only “stand in the beneficiary’s shoes” and claim the income or principal that the
beneficiary is legally entitled to receive at the time he or she is entitled to receive it. See UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 501(2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (2003). See also Charles D. Fox and Michael,
J. Huft, Asset Protection and Dynasty Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 287 (2002).
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transfer tax.72 If the property can stay in trust in perpetuity, the
property is put beyond the transfer tax regime forever.
So, not only is the overall transfer tax burden on multiple generations
lessened substantially if the property is placed in trust, but also the
longer the trust lasts – and the more generations of a family that can
benefit from the property while it is in trust, the greater the overall tax
savings. In short, the longer the term of the trust, the more “taxefficient” the trust is.
Until the late 1980s, efforts to extend the time horizon for a trust into
the distant future were thwarted by the common law Rule against
Perpetuities.73 A movement to repeal the Rule74 has been fairly
successful, however, and, to date, as many as eighteen states and the
District of Columbia have eliminated the Rule altogether or amended
their existing statutes to allow donors of trusts to opt out.75 A trust
can be now be virtually of infinite duration, provided it is established
in a “non-perpetuities” jurisdiction. Leaving aside strategies for
funding a perpetual trust, the mere fact that trusts can last in
perpetuity constitutes an enormous advantage for wealthy families,

72

Many provisions under of the federal transfer tax regime make it advantageous for the trustee to be an
independent party, placing the exercise of certain aspects of fiduciary discretion outside the family – and
not in the hands of the donor of any trust or any beneficiary. For example, neither the donor of a given
trust nor the beneficiaries of it should control of discretionary distributions of income or principal. If the
donor retains control of distributions from the trust, this power can potentially cause inclusion of the
property subject to the discretion in the donor’s estate. See I.R.C. § 2036, 2038 (2008). If a beneficiary can
make distributions to herself or to someone for whom she has a support obligation, this control will under
certain circumstances be deemed a general power of appointment and cause inclusion of the property
subject to the power in her estate. See I.R.C. § 2041 (2008). Further, if a family member controls
distributions from a trust where she is not a beneficiary, but where other family members are beneficiaries,
her control here can also trigger application of the “reciprocal trust doctrine,” especially if she is a
beneficiary of a second trust, one where those other family members are trustees. See United States v.
Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969). The consequence of running afoul of these rules is to make property
once transferred into trust and (supposedly) beyond the reach of the transfer tax regime again subject to tax.
Where the exercise of fiduciary powers through a family trust company is concerned, however, the Internal
Revenue Service has recently begun to lay this matter to rest, providing guidance with respect to decisionmaking structures within a family trust company that will conform to the requirements of the transfer tax
regime with respect to discretionary distributions of trust income and principal.
73
Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P for the
R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2100 (2003).
74
This movement was spearheaded by elements of the estate planning bar and certain banking interests. See
Robert H. Sikoff and Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical
Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the
Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 596 (2005).
75
The eighteen states that have eliminated the Rule or allow settlors to opt out are Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakora, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. In addition, Florida permits a trust
to last up to 360 years and Nevada, 365. Utah allows a trust to exist for 1000 years.
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because once wealth is in a perpetual trust it sits beyond the reach of
the transfer tax regime forever.76
And the fact that to date only eighteen or so states have eliminated the
Rule against Perpetuities is no impediment to a wealthy family still
living in a perpetuities jurisdiction. Wherever family members live,
the family simply needs to name a trustee in a non-perpetuities
jurisdiction who then administers the trust in that state.77 The need
for a “nexus” with a non-perpetuities jurisdiction does, however,
mean that, for a family planning to place a family trust company at
the helm as trustee of a perpetual trust, the family needs to establish
its trust company in a state that not only permits a modern family trust
company but also has eliminated the Rule against Perpetuities.
Fortunately, for the family wanting to establish its own trust company
and name that entity trustee of a perpetual trust, many of the states
that have liberalized their laws with respect to forming privately
owned, family trust companies have also changed their laws with
respect to the Rule against Perpetuities to make them attractive to
those looking to place significant wealth in trust with their own trust
company as trustee.78
b. Funding the Trust. The fact that great wealth can escape transfer tax
so long as it is in trust does not eliminate the potential tax when the
property is initially transferred, an amount that for a family with great
wealth can still be considerable. Once a perpetual trust has been
established, then the scene shifts to strategies to transfer property into it
with little to no transfer tax liability. This is accomplished exploiting
the various credits and exemptions from transfer tax under the Internal
Revenue Code (included there so that taxpayers of modest means can
transfer assets without incurring liability). For the very wealthy,
however, the trick is not to use these credits and exemptions “dollarfor-dollar” -- i.e., a dollar of credit or exemption applied to shelter a
dollar of family wealth. Instead, sophisticated planning techniques
(like the Note-Sale) subject assets to discounting techniques and then in
various way “leverage” the credits and exemptions, so that the dollar
limitations as per the Internal Revenue Code become more apparent
than real.

76

BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS 120.1, at
120-1 to –2 (2d ed. Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1993). See also JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK &
MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 822-23 ( 2d ed. Foundation Press 2003).
77
Of course, the family could also employ an individual trustee resident in jurisdiction or big bank trustee
authorized to conduct trust business in the jurisdiction with the caveats stated supra, .
78
That is, trusts that name the family trust company as the initial trustee. Trusts for which the family trust
company is successor trustee are another question. The family trust company cannot create nexus with
respect to all important legal issues for a trust that names as initial trustee a person domiciled in another
jurisdiction or another trust company located in another jurisdiction.
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(i) The Unified Credit and the GST Exemption. Like all non-charitable
gratuitous transfers, transfers into trust are subject to Estate Tax (if
made at death) or to Gift Tax (if made during life). Shelter from the
Estate and Gift Tax is available, however, in the form of the Unified
Credit.
If the trust benefits grandchildren and more remote
descendants, then in addition to Estate or Gift Tax, transfers to the trust
will be subject to Generation-Skipping Tax. Generation-skipping
transfers can also be sheltered, however -- with the GST Exemption.
With respect to the Unified Credit, every transferor currently has a
lifetime Credit sufficient to shelter up to $3.5 million in transfers made
during life or at death. At present, however, only $1 million of the
Credit is available to be used during life, and, accordingly, this amount
becomes the operative figure for many planning strategies. This is
because, even though the Unified Credit can be applied to transfers
made at death, most of the more sophisticated tax planning strategies
make use of transfers not at death but during life – gifts essentially.
There are reasons for this, the most important of which is that gifts can
be timed – effectively giving the taxpayer significant control over the
value of the gift. This control over the timing of the transfer – and
thereby the value of the gift for transfer tax purposes -- is a large
element of not only the note-sale, but also other strategies as well. 79
But there is an additional transfer tax that is applicable to transfers
made to a long-term or perpetual trust – the Generation-Skipping
Transfer Tax. The Estate and Gift Tax is designed to tax wealth every
generation. Nevertheless, as we have noted, long-term trusts benefiting
successive generations can neatly avoid the successive impositions of
estate and gift tax even as the property in trust becomes available to
grandchildren and more remote descendants. The Generation-Skipping
Transfer Tax was devised by Congress in 198680 to close this loophole
and subject generation-skipping transfers (whether made outright or in
trust) to a separate and additional tax. Thus, like all non-charitable
gratuitous transfers, generation-skipping transfers are subject either to
the Gift Tax (if they occur during life) or to the Estate Tax (if they
occur at death). But where the transfer is to or for the benefit of
grandchildren or more remote descendants, the transfer is also subject
to GST Tax (in addition to Estate or Gift Tax). 81 Taken together, the
79

A second reason that gifts are more “tax efficient” than transfers at death is that gifts are tax-exclusive
while transfers at death are tax-inclusive. This means that the funds used to pay gift tax are not themselves
subject to tax, while funds used to pay estate tax form part of the base against which the rate of taxation is
applied. See, CAMPFIELD, DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 12 (23d ed.
West Group 2006). This second reason is less relevant here in that no transfer tax will be paid.
80
A federal tax on generation-skipping transfers was first enacted in 1976. This tax was considered
conceptually flawed and it was substantially repealed and a new tax was enacted in 1986. See, CAMPFIELD,
DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 727 (23d ed. West Group 2006)
81
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax is applicable to transfer made to or for the benefit of a “skip person”
as per I.R.C. § 2613(a)(1), meaning any person of a generation more than one below the transferor (such as
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Estate or Gift Tax and the GST Tax make for a virtually confiscatory
imposition of tax.82
For those seeking to circumvent the transfer tax regime with long-term
trusts, such is the bad news. There is also good news, however, in the
form of a lifetime exemption from the GST Tax, currently in the
amount of $3.5 million, the entire amount of which can be used to
shelter transfers made during life or at death. While (unlike the Unified
Credit) the entire GST Exemption of $3.5 million can be used for
transfers during life if the taxpayer so chooses, the transfer will also be
subject to the Gift Tax – and there the Unified Credit will shelter only
$1 million of the transfer. Consequently, even though a transfer in
excess of $1 million could be sheltered from GST Tax, the excess
would be subject to Gift Tax. Therefore, the $1 million amount
sheltered by the Unified Credit operates for most wealthy donors as a
cap here as well, as families tend to be disinclined to incur tax for
lifetime transfers.83
(ii) The Note-Sale. Transfers to a perpetual trust will then be subject
both to Gift Tax and to Generation-Skipping Tax and must be sheltered
from both unless a tax is to be paid. The Note-Sale is a strategy for
sheltering the funding of a perpetual trust and constitutes a two-stroke
a grandchild). “Direct skips” to such persons are taxable and would include gifts outright and gifts in trusts
that benefit solely skip persons. Tax is typically paid when such trusts are established. Where trusts
benefit both skip and non-skip (i.e., children) persons, then “taxable distributions” of income and principal
from such trusts as well as “taxable terminations” from such trusts (where property goes outright to one or
more skip persons) are subject to tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2612(b), 2612(a)(1)(A) (2008). See, CAMPFIELD,
DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 735-36 (23d ed. West Group 2006)
82
See, CAMPFIELD, DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 735-36 (23d ed.
West Group 2006)
83
Because Gift Tax will have to be paid if the taxpayer makes lifetime transfers in excess of $1 million,
transfers to a perpetual trust are unlikely to be made in excess of $1 million. This is particularly the case at
this time. While paying tax is never appealing, it is especially unattractive in this era which is one of
certain change where the transfer tax regime is concerned. The fruition of George W. Bush’s 2000
presidential platform of eliminating transfer taxes (what he called “death taxes”), the Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 provided for repeal of the Estate Tax for those dying after December
31, 2009 and for repeal of the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax for generation-skipping transfers taking
place after the same date. When Congress realized the costs of a permanent repeal, however, they backpeddled, deciding to phase out these taxes gradually, over the next nine years, then to have one year (from
December 31, 2009 to January 1, 2011) in which these two transfer taxes were repealed, but then (absent
additional legislation) to repeal the “repeal” effective January 1, 2011. This means that, absent additional
legislation, the repealed estate and generation-skipping taxes and all the phased in changes in rates and
exemptions as well as all other changes wrought by the 2001 Act, will come back into effect on January 1,
2011. If no additional legislation is passed and the repeal of the repeal actually occurs, then the Estate Tax
and the Generation-Skipping Tax as it existed prior to the 2001 Act would spring back to again be the law
of the land. Nevertheless, questions remain concerning the size of the Unified Credit going forward and
more than speculation that, whatever the amount of the Unified Credit, it will (like the Generation-Skipping
Tax Exemption) be available for use in its entirety during life or at death. Clearly under these
circumstances, it would be a rare client indeed who could be advised to incur a gift tax. Jonathan Weisman,
Obama Plans to Keep Estate Tax Democrats Want to Freeze Levy at Current Levels, WALL ST. J., January
12, 2009 at A1.
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finesse of the meager $1 million of Unified Credit applicable to gifts
and the Generation-Skipping Tax Exemption that it effectively caps.
A. Step One: The Valuation Envelope. If the GST Exemption and Gift
Tax Credit are applied dollar-for-dollar, $1 million of GST Exemption
and the current Gift Tax Credit will shelter only $1 million of assets.
There are, however, more tax-efficient ways to make gifts and to use
the GST Exemption as well as the Gift Tax Credit. Family assets84 are
made eligible for valuation discounting by first (before they are
transferred into trust) swallowing them in a family limited partnership,
a close corporation, or a limited liability company. This entity will be
capitalized into voting and non-voting shares and, for the time being,
the head of the family retains both.
At this point the stage is set to make more effective use of the GST
Exemption and Gift Tax Credit. The non-voting shares are now
eligible for a valuation discount, for both lack of marketability (because
they represent an interest in a closely-held entity)85 and lack of control
(because they have no voting rights).86 Conservative planners would
generally apply a 40% discount under these circumstances.87 So assets
that would be worth $1 million (if held free of the closely-held entity)
84

Assets that might be transferred into this closely-held envelope include a family business (an operating
company which may itself be closely-held), publicly-traded securities, real estate, private equity, etc. Once
the closely-held envelope is created and assets have been transferred to it, the head of the family takes back
the voting and non-voting shares. See, Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving
Wealth into the Next Millennium Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at 68.
85
Discounts as high as 35% are commonly applied in valuing interests in closely-held businesses – that is
to say, in valuing interests for which there is little to no market because they are not publicly traded.
Valuing closely-held interests begins by reference to comparable assets that are publicly-traded. Then,
assuming there is as no ready market for the particular interests in question, a discount is applied under the
assumption that a buyer would not pay as much for such interests. See Rev. Rul. 59-60. (If any stock is
also subject to restrictions on sale, the marketability discount can be substantially greater. See Estate of
McClatchy v. Comm’r., 147 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir., 1998).) Note, however, that the Internal Revenue Service
can resist or seek to reduce a marketability discount where a closely-held entity is holding assets that are
readily marketable. See McCord v. Comm’r., 120 T.C. 358 (2003) concerning two limited partnerships,
where one-third of one partnership and two-thirds of a second partnership consisted in marketable
securities or interests in real estate holding partnerships. The taxpayer claimed a 35% discount for lack of
marketability, but the Tax Court reduced the discount to 20%. Even in this instance, however, some
discount was deemed justified given the partnership envelope.
86
The ability to obtain a discount for lack of control even where all the interests in the closely-held entity
are owned within a family (or by trusts for their benefit) is the progeny of Estate of Bright v. Unites States,
658 F.2d 999 (1981). Bright vindicated a long established precedent that attribution should not apply to
lump together family members’ stock for valuation purposes under the transfer tax regime. See also, Rev.
Rul. 93-12( where the Service acquiesced in Bright). See further discussion of the significance of Bright in
Note , infra.
87
In the past courts have granted a single discount percentage, such as 40%, without segregating the
discount attributable to minority status from that attributable to lack of marketability. It is important to
recognize the distinction between the discount for lack of control and that for lack of marketability,
however, because in recent years the courts have tended (quite properly) to analyze these discounts
separately in arriving at a discount appropriate in a given situation. See, Estate of McClatchy v. Comm’r.,
147 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir., 1998).
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can now be valued at $600,000. Accordingly, $1 million of the GST
Tax Exemption and the Gift Tax Credit can now be used to shelter
assets that would have a value of approximately $1.667 million were
they held free of the closely-held entity. Note also that these amounts
will double in the case of a married couple planning together.
The head of the family then transfers $1 million in cash or equivalents
to the perpetual trust.88 Under the Note-Sale strategy, this transfer (the
“seeding” of the trust) is the only transfer that is actually a “gift” for
Gift Tax purposes and it is here that the Gift Tax Credit and $1 million
of the GST Exemption are applied.
(B) Step Two: Purchase of Discounted Assets. The placement of a
family’s wealth into a closely-held entity and the establishment of a
perpetual trust are preliminary steps. While some advantage would be
gained if the non-voting (now discounted) shares were simply
contributed to the perpetual trust, this would not realize the full
potential of the Exemption or the Credit. At this juncture the trustee of
the trust (here the Family Trust Company) steps forward and purchases
$10 million of the non-voting shares from the head of the family and
gives back an installment note89 in the amount of $9 million, along with
the $1 million (just received when the trust was seeded) as a down
payment. Per the note, the trustee is required to pay interest-only
during the term, with principal due in nine years (at the end of the term)
in the form of a balloon payment, with a right of prepayment.90
Courtesy of the trustee’s purchase of the assets in exchange for the
note, the fair market value of the assets that ultimately fund the trust is
$10 million instead of $1 million (the amount contributed gratuitously).
Further, because the assets were initially placed in a closely-held entity,
the $10 million of assets that ultimately fund the trust would be worth
88

Either cash or discounted assets can be used here, although the real advantage of the discounted assets
materializes in Step Two. See Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth
into the Next Millennium Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at 68.
89
The terms of the loan are governed by many considerations under the transfer tax regime. First, the loan
will be an intra-family loan and so, to avoid gift-loan treatment under I.R.C. § 7872, it must bear an interest
rate of at least the Applicable Federal Rate. This is a market rate of interest determined by reference to the
average yield on United States government obligations. As it works out, however, the rate is generally
more than fair to the borrower when compared to rates that are likely to be commercially available. The
nine-year term will make it a long-term loan under § 7872 and make it eligible for the long-term interest
rate (usually a lower rate than the shorter term rates). See I.R.C. §§ 7872(f)(2), 1274(d)(1)(C) (2008). The
Applicable Federal Rates are re-determined each month. I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(B) (2008). For term loans of
more than three years, the market interest rates for longer term obligations are used, depending on the term
of the loan. In the case of a term loan, the Applicable Federal Rate for the entire period of the loan is
determined by the rate for the month in which the loan is made. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(A) (2008). In the case
of a demand loan (which has no application in the Note-Sale), the rate varies from month to month as the
Federal rates are re-determined. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(B) (2008).
90
The loan will be a intra-family loan. So to avoid gift-loan treatment the interest rate will be determined
by Applicable Federal Rate. The 9-year term will make it a long-term loan. See I.R.C. § 7872 (2008).
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approximately $16.67 million if they were held free of this entity – or
$20 million and approximately $33.3 million, respectively, in the case
of a married couple.
The $10 million amount of the note is only ten times the $1 million
gift, a margin that is not to great that it vitiates the claim that the entire
transaction has a business purpose,91 thereby placing the transaction
beyond the scope of the transfer tax regime. The goal here is to
eliminate any implication that the loan is a donative transfer for
purposes of the transfer tax regime. Under the Gift Tax Regulations,
the transfer is not a gift if it is “a sale, exchange, or other transfer of
property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is
bona fide, arm’s-length, and free of any donative intent).”92 Other
elements of the transaction also lend support to the claim that the Note
has a business purpose, including the timing of the purchase of the
shares relative to the funding of the trust where at least a six-month’s
lag is recommended.93
91

The business purpose of the closely-held entity also lends support to the business purpose of the entire
transaction. The closely-held entity needs a genuine business purpose beyond its role in a tax-minimization
strategy. Such a purpose could be, for example, the need to bring managerial integration to a diverse and
complex portfolio of assets. Absence of some bona fide business purpose will invite numerous objections
(see Note , infra) from the Internal Revenue Service and the courts such that the closely-held entity is
likely to be viewed a mere tax avoidance artifice. This is especially the case where this “wrapper” holds
largely passive investment assets (such as marketable securities) that could just as well be held outright.
See Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the Next Millennium
Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at 68. Regarding the inclusion of passive investments, see
McCord v. Comm., 120 T.C. 358 (2003), discussed in note , infra. In addition, care must be taken that the
closely-held entity is used in a way consistent with a business purpose. For example, all assets should not
be transferred into the closely-held entity necessitating the payment of household obligations out of the
closely-held entity. See also, Note , infra.
92
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (2007). To escape Gift Tax treatment, it is also important here to establish
that the transfer was for “adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.” Id. The element of
consideration not only removes the transfer from the realm of the gift tax, but also ensures that the value of
the trust will not be includible in the donor’s estate under Sections 2036 and 2038 if she were to die during
the term of the Note. Attention to the valuation of assets transferred into trust is then important. (The plan
here is to have the note repaid before the donor dies – thus the prepayment provision of the Note.) In the
event, however, that the donor dies during the term of the Note, the Note itself will be in the donor’s estate,
but it may be eligible for discounting because of its long-term and low interest rate. Richard A. Oshins and
Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the Next Millennium Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES,
October 1998, at 68. Furthermore and most importantly, however, if the Note winds up in the donor’s
estate, the appreciated assets of the trust do not. See “opportunity shifting,” infra, .
93
Recently, the Internal Revenue Service has attacked the use of closely-held entities as discounting
devices by relying on I.R.C. Section 2036(a). Several decades of case law (in which the Internal Revenue
Service has acquiesced) preclude the Service from attacking the discount by aggregating the interests of
family members (and trusts for their benefit) in determining whether the value of closely-held interests
should be discounted for lack of control. See Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (1981) (in
which the Internal Revenue Service acquiesced in Rev. Rul. 93-12). In two cases with similar facts, the
Internal Revenue Service has more successfully applied Section 2036(a), however, as it includes in the
decedent’s gross estate any asset as to which the decedent has retained a right to the income from the
property. In two cases with similar facts, the Internal Revenue Service has successively applied Section
2036(a) to include the underlying assets held in any entity in a decedent transferor’s estate where the
partnership was formed only shortly before the decedent’s death (lending an aura of the testamentary
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The Note-Sale also exploits aspects of the income tax regime. The trust
will be drafted so that, during the life of the donor, it will be a “grantor
trust” for income tax purposes. This “grantor trust status” is created by
turning to the parts of the Internal Revenue Code that govern the
income tax regime and including a provision in the trust that
intentionally violates one or more of the grantor trust rules under IRC
Sections 673 through 679 -- -- for example, by giving the donor the
right to exchange property in the trust for property of equivalent
value.94 Whatever power is included here, it is unlikely that the donor
will exercise it. This does not matter. The mere presence of the power
in the trust agreement will ensure that the donor is considered the
“owner” of trust assets for income tax purposes and – most importantly
– transactions between the trust and the donor (the Note-Sale, for
example) will be ignored for income tax purposes.95 Thus, while the
sale of the non-voting shares to the trustee would otherwise be a
realization event for income tax purpose, no gain will have to be
recognized. For income tax purposes, it is as if the trust does not exist
and the transaction did not happen.96
(iii) Other Strategies. Effective as the Note-Sale might be for
transferring tens of millions of dollars with the application of only the
$1 million Gift Tax Credit and $1 million of the GST Exemption, many
families still find themselves with considerable wealth remaining in the
hands of the donor generation. Other strategies with which to transfer
substitute to the transaction) and the decedent transferred nearly all his net worth to the closely-held entity,
necessitating that he rely on income from the entity for his support until his death (the last being critical to
the application of Section 2036(a). Finally, the entity was funded almost entirely with marketable
securities. See Strangi v. Comm’r., 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005); Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r., 382
F.3d 367 (3rd Cir. 2004). In another case, however, Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257 (5th
Cir. 2004), the Fifth Circuit reached a contrary result. While as in Thompson and Strangi, the decedent had
transferred property to a family limited partnership not long before his death, in Kimbell there were good
business reasons for placing the assets (which included oil and gas working interests) in a partnership.
Further the transferor retained sufficient property to provide for his own support. Advisers maintain that
care must be taken to see that the closely-held entity is created well in advance of the death of the
transferor, that there is a business purpose (other than tax avoidance) for creation of the entity, that all the
formalities of maintaining and operating the closely-held entity are observed, that assets transferred to the
entity are operating assets requiring management (rather than passive investment assets, such as marketable
securities), and that the decedent has retained sufficient wealth to support herself without receiving income
from the entity.
94
This planning opportunity is possible because the grantor trust rules (which are primarily creatures of the
income tax regime) do not work in pari materia with the gift tax regime. Care must be taken, however, to
make certain that this retained power offends only with respect to the income tax regime, but does not
vitiate the transfer for purpose of the transfer tax regime. For purposes of the Estate and Gift Tax or indeed
the Generation-skipping Tax, it is essential that the transfer be complete.
95
The IRS has opined in Rev. Rul. 85-13 and in several private letter rulings. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-13,
1985-1 C.B. 184.
96
Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the Next Millennium Part
II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at 6. See also Randall D. Roth, The Intentional Use of TaxDefective Trusts, Presentation at the University of Miami, 26th Institution. On Estate Planning (1992).
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additional wealth with little to no transfer tax are available, however,
and this is the case even if the donor generation has completely
exhausted its $1 million ($2 million in the case of a couple) gift tax
Unified Credit. Indeed, especially popular in such circumstances is the
Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT) and in particular its most
aggressive application, the “zeroed out” GRAT.
The GRAT is a creature of reforms enacted in 1990 that resulted in the
addition of Chapter 14 of the Estate and Gift Tax with its special
valuation rules.97 These strict valuation rules are applicable to certain
transfers in trust, especially those where the donor generation retains a
present interest (structured as an annuity98), while transferring a
remainder interest to the donee generation (thereby making a gift to
them).
Consistent with the Chapter 14 valuation rules, if the income interest
retained by the donor generation is large enough, the actuarial value of
the remainder – the gift to the donee generation – will be zero or very
close to it, making for a “zeroed-out GRAT.”99 Where the value of the
remainder is zero or nearly so, there will little to no gift tax due on the
transfer – a welcome outcome where the donor generation has already
exhausted its gift tax Unified Credit. The value of the remainder
interest will be zero where the donor generation retains a very large
income interest. To satisfy this income interest will require (pursuant
to the required valuation methodology) not only the income produced
97

These valuation rules were meant to eliminate certain capitalization strategies by which closely-held
companies were capitalized so that the donor generation could retain a preferred interest in a family
business, while the younger generation received common stock. These interests were subjected to various
favorable valuation techniques so that the interest passing to the donee generation was often valued at a
fraction of its worth at the time of the transfer. See, CAMPFIELD, DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF
ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 230-36 (23d ed. West Group 2006).
98
Of course, the value of the gift also reflects the retained annuity. This income interest must consist in
annual payments of either (1) a fixed dollar amount or (2) an amount equal to a fixed percentage of the trust
value, determined annually. See I.R.C. §§ 2702(b)(1)-(2) (2008). Where an income interest does not
conform to these requirements, the income interest will be valued at zero – potentially making for an
expensive gift to the donee generation of 100% of the value of the property transferred into trust. By
imposing such constraints upon the terms of the retained interest (if it is to be deemed worth anything at all
for transfer tax purposes), the Congress has sought to ensure that the future interest transferred to the donee
generation will submit to valuation techniques that realistically capture what that generation is receiving.
I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(A) (2008).
99
The “zeroed out” GRAT was for some time deemed controversial as the Internal Revenue Service and
the estate planning bar argued about the meaning and interpretation of Example 5 under Reg. 25.2702-3(e).
The IRS had argued that the retained interest should be valued as an annuity payable for the shorter of the
term of the retained annuity or the grantor’s death. This analysis would reduce the value of the retained
interest and therefore increase the value of the remainder (the gift). The Tax Court, examining the
legislative history of section 2702 and concluded that Reg. 25.2702-3(e) Example 5 is an “unreasonable
interpretation and invalid extension” of section 2702. Walton v. Comm’r 115 T.C. 589, 604 (2000). The
Commissioner has since acquiesced in the Tax Court holding and has issued Regulations affirming the
result in the case. See Rev. Rul. 2003-72, 2003-2 C.B. 964; Treas. Reg. 25.2702-3(e) (2007) Examples 5,
6, and 8.
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by the trust assets, but also a return of principal. At the end of the
annuity term, nothing will be left to be distributed to the donee
generation – or at least per the Chapter 14 valuation rules. 100 Of
course, these calculations are predicated on the value of the property on
the date it is transferred into trust together with the imputed rate of
appreciation. The donor is betting, however, that the reality will be
very different – a point to which we will return momentarily.
But there are drawbacks to the GRAT.
Probably its biggest
disadvantage is that it does not readily lend itself to a perpetual trust.
The donor’s GST Exemption cannot be applied to shelter the property
transferred to the GRAT until the expiration of the donor’s present
interest. By that point, if all has gone according to plan, the assets will
have appreciated far in excess of their initial worth. In short, this
means that the GST Exemption cannot be leveraged here, but must be
applied dollar-for-dollar.101 For this reason GRAT remaindermen are
always children and not more remote generations (to avoid generationskipping liability).102 Absent application of the GST Exemption,
transfers to subsequent generations will be subject to transfer tax.
100

Some practitioners refer to this as a “Walton GRAT” as it was used rather famously by Audrey Walton,
a member of the family that founded Wal-Mart Stores, to make transfers in trust for her daughters. The
mother transferred 7.2 million shares of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. into trusts for her daughters, the value of the
stock transferred into each trust being $100,000,000. The trusts were to last two years and at the end of this
period the remaining principal was to be transferred outright to the daughters. Each of the trusts by its
terms provided that in the first year the mother would receive a payment equal to 49.35% of the trust value
and in the second year she would receive a payment equal to 59.22% of the trust value. Any property in the
trust remaining at termination would go tax-free to the daughters. Taking into account the imputed rated of
appreciation under section 7520 in effect for April of 1993 (when the transfers into trust were made), the
actuarial value of each daughter’s remainder was $6,195. As it turned out, the price of Wal-Mart stock
declined and the payments to the mother exhausted the trust so that in truth the daughters received nothing.
If Wal-Mart stock had risen in value, however, a great deal of value might have been passed to the
daughters at minimal tax cost. At inception it was anticipated that, as per Chapter 14 methodology, the
value of the total payments to be made to the mother from each trust would be $109,000,000. If the WalMart stock in each trust had risen in value to $119,000,000 by the time the trust terminated, however, each
daughter would have received $119,000,000 less $109,000,000 or $10,000,000. And this would have been
the case even though as per the valuation at the creation of the trust each daughter’s interest was worth only
$6,195.
101
Where the grantor of a trust has retained an interest in the trust, GST Exemption cannot be applied to the
trust until the termination of the donor’s interest when the trust is not longer potentially an asset of her
estate (the “estate tax inclusion period” as per IRC Section 2642(f)). This is generally referred to as an
“ETIP” problem. In short, the GST Exemption cannot be leveraged when it is applied to a GRAT, but must
be applied dollar-for-dollar. The constraint imposed by Section 2642(f) is not a problem with respect to the
Note-Sale because the grantor of the perpetual trust retains no interest in it. See, Richard A. Oshins and
Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the Next Millennium Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES,
October 1998, at 68.
102
There are other drawbacks to the GRAT. First, in utilizing the Note-Sale strategy, it is advantageous if
the grantor of the perpetual trust (and holder of the Note) survives the term of the Note so that the Note
does not wind up an asset of his estate. (SCIN) But it does not entirely scrub the plan if in fact the grantor
dies before this happens. In the case of a GRAT, the grantor of the trust must survive the term of the
retained annuity or all the property in the trust will restored to his estate for estate tax purposes under IRC
Section 2036(a). Second, with respect to the Note-Sale, the rate of return that must be applied to the Note
is almost always gong to be lower than the rate used to value the GRAT remainder because of the
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Other “high-tech” strategies also remain – large designs that again
allow a wealthy family to minimize its transfer tax liability, even where
the Unified Credit and Generation-Skipping Tax Exemption have been
exhausted. For example, the charitable lead trust is a split-interest trust
that can allow a family to transfer significant wealth to children and
more remote generations with little to no transfer tax liability. As with
the GRAT, the donor can effectively “zero out” the charitable lead trust
by setting the payments to charity high enough so that the present value
of the lead interest to charity will be equal to (or almost equal to) the
full value of the assets contributed to the trust. If the donor zeros out
the trust, the value of the gift to the donee generation will be zero or
close to it and again no transfer tax will be owed.
(iv) Beating the Imputed Rate of Appreciation. If any of these
strategies are to “work,” however, at a minimum the assets have to
appreciate at a rate higher than the interest rate on the loan (in the case
of the Note-Sale) or higher than the imputed rate of growth under
Chapter 14 (in the case of the GRAT or the charitable lead trust). In
the case of the Note-Sale, this is highly likely to happen. The
discounting of the assets by virtue of the closely-held “wrapper”
ultimately ensures the assets that make their way into the trust are more
valuable than the amount the trustee has paid for them.
Finally, valuation discounts and leveraging notwithstanding, any of
these strategies realizes its greatest potential where the underlying
assets (those transferred to the closely-held entity) hold significant
appreciation potential. The prospects for transferring wealth between
generations without having to pay transfer tax increase exponentially if
the property placed into the closely-held entity is a business just being
formed, a new product being developed, a new location for an existing
business, an investment opportunity, or a closely-held business soon to
go public. Ideally, the assets transferred into the “envelope” are
significant interests in a venture that can reasonably be predicted to
explode in value. It is here that $33 or so million (itself transferred
without paying transfer tax) can easily become $100 million.103
Of course, if these assets are going to be transferred into trust (even as
non-voting share of a closely-held wrapper), the family requires a
difference in requirements of the valuation regimen applicable in each case. The consequence is that the
rate of appreciation that must be achieved for the Note-Sale to be successful is likely to be lower that the
rate for the GRAT. See, Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the
Next Millennium Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at 68.
103

The timing of the transfer has to be carefully calculated, however, for example, in the instance of an
initial public offering where the stock is to be valued before the public offering. If this value is to be
sustained, the more time between the transfer into trust and the public offering, the better.
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trustee that is willing to hold such an investment. At this point, the
stage is set to consider the legal discretion a trustee might have to do
just that.
Part III: Putting the Pedal to the Metal: Fiduciary Investment Discretion
If the dissipation of assets once they are in trust is indeed the last
frontier in the preservation of great fortunes, it is no longer plausible to
chalk this up simply to the drain of transfer tax. Indeed, wealthy
families whose property has long been in trust (where it was safe from
the dissipating pressure of the fisc) have for decades appreciated the
perniciousness effects of a conservative fiduciary investment
philosophy (supported by a conservative law governing fiduciary
investment discretion)104. For the more recently wealthy, concern with
fiduciary investing has come front and center. These families are
relying on tax-minimizing strategies (such as the Note-Sale) that not
only transfer assets into trust with little to no transfer tax liability, but
make integral to the plan a certain rate of appreciation with respect to
transferred assets. These modern strategies can only succeed if the
property transferred consists in appreciating, potentially volatile assets
– and, moreover, that those assets do indeed appreciate, volatility
notwithstanding. Moreover, these families understand the element of
risk that was in play in making their fortunes and are looking to bring
this entrepreneurial mindset to the management of these assets going
forward. The modern fiduciary duty of care can contemplate an
aggressive investment posture on the part of a trustee, especially where
the trust is holding a large portfolio and the time horizon as per the trust
terms is long enough. The new standard of care makes it possible to do
with property in trust what has rarely been done before105 -- and
potentially great fortunes do not merely cease to wane, but can actually
appreciate. There is simply one proviso – that the fiduciary is willing
to embrace the new standard of fiduciary investment responsibility in
all its potential.
The common law trust has existed for centuries but only in recent
decades has the law governing fiduciary investing done other than
encourage trustees to conserve trust property. For many years the
trustee’s primary duty was to avoid risk, including the risk inherent in
investing assets for growth.106 And a case can be made that this risk104
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averse attitude comported with donors’ expectations, especially in
earlier eras when the asset placed in trust was almost certainly land and
the only reason to transfer property to future generations in trust (rather
than outright) was to avoid transfer tax.107 When the likely res ceased
to be land and became a portfolio of marketable securities, however,
donors and their beneficiaries began to rankle under a law that looked
only to conserve assets at nominal value, while the purchasing power of
those assets declined. Donors and beneficiaries alike noted that
between inflation and trustees’ commissions, assets placed in trust
dwindled, however modest the distributions to beneficiaries as per the
trust agreement.
a. Prudent Man. This focus on conserving the face value of trust assets
was mandated under the earlier law governing investment of trust
assets, the Prudent Man Rule, usually dated from the 1830 case,
Harvard College v. Amory.108 In Amory, the court directed that in
investing trustees should proceed as “men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but
in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested.” Soon canonical, the Prudent Man rule with its emphasis on
capital preservation and distaste for speculation made its way into the
Restatement of Trusts109 in 1935 and later in 1959 into the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts.110 Underscoring the duty to preserve capital, the
Restatement Second directed the trustee to “to make such investments
and only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own
property having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount
and regularity of the income to be derived[.]”111
Under Prudent Man, the methodology of risk assessment required the
trustee weigh each asset in isolation rather than as an element of a
larger portfolio. This approach had the consequence of prohibiting
certain investments entirely and rendering others (such and U.S.
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Treasuries where principle was for all intents and purposes guaranteed)
inherently safe. Furthermore, trustees shied away from new types of
investments. And delegation of investment authority (something that
the introduction of new types of investments might require) was simply
verboten.112
b. Prudent Investor. About twenty years ago, however, the law
governing the investment of trust assets began to change. Sophisticated
studies examining financial markets in light of modern “Portfolio
Theory” suggested that complaints of settlors and beneficiaries bespoke
economic reality, especially once trusts were no longer invested in
land, but rather in marketable securities. The law responded with a
new standard to govern the investment of trust funds. Prudent Investor
supplanted Prudent Man.113
As a theory of efficient markets, modern Portfolio Theory provided a
new understanding of the risk inherent in investing (including investing
in trust) and suggested a new methodology by which to manage it. At
its core efficient market theory teaches us that it is impossible to predict
which securities will do better or worse. Simply stated, each security
has risks. Even an investment (such as a U.S. Treasury bill) seeming to
conserve trust principal at its face value is itself not without risk – if
nothing else, the risk of inflation.114 All that can be done with respect
to risk is to manage it.
To manage risk begins by appreciating that every security is subject to
risk of two types.115 Market risk plagues all securities indiscriminately
and reflects general economic and political conditions – for example,
the risk of an attack by a foreign power (such as the attacks on 9-11), a
general economic downturn (such as the current global recession), or a
change in interest rates by the Federal Reserve. With respect to market
risk, little can be done to mitigate volatility. The only comfort to be
had lies in the knowledge that, when the investment is made, the
market factors this risk into the return. A higher market risk garners a
higher rate of return. Market risk is compensated risk.116
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In contrast, non-market or industry risk is the risk that something will
affect the fortunes of a particular industry or firm – for example, an ore
necessary to production of a particular product becomes unavailable.
And within a particular firm, there is the further risk that a key person
dies unexpectedly or that a fire makes a plant inoperable.117 Where
industry risk is concerned, however, the return does not reflect the risk.
The only way to manage industry risk is through diversification of
investments within a portfolio – diversification among financial sectors
and within financial sectors.118
Thus, given that no one can outsmart the market and that risk is
inherent in all investing, an investor can only proceed by determining
the level of volatility (including the risk of inflation) that she is willing
to accept in exchange for the return she hopes to receive. This will
determine the level of market risk she assumes. Then, with respect to
non-market risk, an investor diversifies her portfolio bearing in mind
the level of market risk she has chosen.119
In 1987, there began a fundamental revision in the law governing the
investment of trust property in light of this theory of efficient markets.
Especially important were its implications for the concept of “prudent
investment.”
The American Law Institute started revising the
Restatement of Trusts in 1991 and released the final text in 1992. The
Uniform Law Commission followed suit and in 1994 codified the
revised Restatement principles as the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.120
To date, XX states have adopted some version of the Uniform Act.
In this new era, trust investment law has set aside its preoccupation
with speculation and speculative investments. “The universe of
investment products changes incessantly,” so the Uniform Act
counsels. “Investments that were at one time thought too risky, such as
equities, or more recently, futures, are now used in fiduciary portfolios.
By contrast, the investment that was at one time thought ideal for trusts,
the long-term bond, has been discovered to import a level of risk and
volatility – in this case, inflation risk – that had not been
anticipated.”121 As part and parcel of this re-framing of the concept of
prudent investing, the law also jettisoned the idea that some categories
117
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of investments are per se prudent and others imprudent,122 in favor of
directing trustees to develop a risk profile appropriate to the particular
trust in question. “Trust beneficiaries are better protected by … close
attention to risk/return objectives…than in attempts to identify
categories of investment that are per se prudent or imprudent.”123 The
trustee is now to invest for “risk and return objectives reasonably suited
to the trust.”124 And the degree of risk appropriate for a particular trust
is highly situational. “Tolerance for risk varies greatly with the
financial and other circumstances of the investor, or in the case of a
trust, with the purposes of the trust and the relevant circumstances of
the beneficiaries[.]” Indeed, if the “main purpose” of the particular
trust “is to support an elderly widow of modest means,” that trust “will
have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a young scion
of great wealth.”125
But addressing market risk through appropriate risk and return
objectives is not all the law now requires of fiduciaries. Industry risk is
not to be ignored either. Portfolio Theory (when it informs the law of
fiduciary duty) mandates a diversified portfolio.
Although
diversification had a place in the old law governing fiduciary
investing,126 the new law enlarges upon its significance. Indeed, the
requirement of diversification serves in the new law to propel the entire
methodology of Prudent Investor toward a comprehensive perspective,
so that attention focuses on the portfolio as a whole with any particular
security justifiable only in relation to the rest of the account.127 As the
Uniform Act counsels, “A trustee’s investment and management
decisions respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation
but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole.” The official
Comment continues: “An investment that might be imprudent standing
alone can become prudent if undertaken in sensible relation to other
trust assets, or to other nontrust assets.”128 Not only is no asset without
risk, but also no asset is inherently appropriate or inappropriate except
in relation to the whole portfolio.
If the requirement of diversification propels the new regime toward a
comprehensive perspective in evaluating risk, this same comprehensive
perspective can at times argue for a suspension of the requirement of
diversification. That is to say, although diversification is central to the
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methodology of Prudent Investor, even diversification can be set aside
if under the circumstances it is prudent to do so. We will return to this
point momentarily.
A final point about the influence of modern Portfolio Theory on the law
of fiduciary investing: Whereas the Prudent Man statute forbade the
delegation of fiduciary investment responsibility,129 the new law is
much more tolerant of delegation and even encourages it in certain
situations.130 Such tolerance is a natural accompaniment to the
recognition that any asset is potentially an appropriate investment. If
any asset is a possible investment in trust, then a trustee potentially
needs to be competent with respect to a breadth of possible
investments, including complex, state-of-the-art vehicles heretofore
rarely found in fiduciary accounts -- futures, derivatives, private equity,
venture capital, closely-held operating companies, etc. Furthermore,
not only would the fiduciary need to be competent to determine
whether any such investment was suitable for the account but, where
the investment was deemed appropriate, she must also be able manage
the asset once it was in trust. Few financial managers are sufficiently
knowledgeable across the financial spectrum to make such decisions
across such a range of complex investments. Accordingly, if the
concept of fiduciary prudence is to be informed by modern portfolio
theory without equivocation, the law must contemplate delegation of
fiduciary investment responsibility to specialized managers where at
least certain assets are concerned.
c. Portfolio Theory and the perpetual trust. This new legal order is an
invitation to trustees to invest assets in ways heretofore unimaginable
for property placed in trust, especially in the case of a perpetual trust
holding a great fortune. Prudent Investor recognized that the mix of
investments and overall risk profile appropriate to a particular account
must speak to the size of the account, the terms of the trust instrument,
and the situations of beneficiaries. Because size of account and
investment horizon now matter in determining the magnitude of risk
appropriate to a trust portfolio, a family that transfers its considerable
wealth into a perpetual trust can justify types of securities with
magnitudes of risk (and with potential returns) that could not be
justified in a smaller trust or in one that would terminate sooner.131
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Academic commentators are well aware of the perpetual trust but, to
date, they tend to view it primarily as a vehicle by which a family
exploits the repeal of the Rule against Perpetuities to place its property
beyond the reach of the transfer tax regime for untold generations to
come. In addition, this literature contains occasional references to the
utility of the perpetual trust for asset protection purposes.132 These
observations are correct, so far as they go. The real significance of the
perpetual trust cannot be appreciated, however, until we discern how it
can serve the family as a multi-generational investment vehicle. Only
then can we see how the attributes of tax minimization and asset
protection contribute to the determination of the overall risk profile
appropriate to the account when portfolio theory governs the
investment of trust property. It here that their true value lies.
Arguably then, a trustee of a large perpetual trust can justify within the
portfolio certain risks that would not be consistent with its fiduciary
duty in other types of trusts. Obviously, the risk calculus now deemed
appropriate to property in trust provides an investment advantage to the
ultra-wealthy (as compared to the merely affluent) who not only have
great wealth to place in trust but whose fortunes are sufficiently large to
fund a trust lasting for multiple generations. To say only this, however,
would be merely to offer the commonplace observation that the rich are
afforded opportunities to get richer that others do not have. The claim
extends further. What is noteworthy in the case of the perpetual trust is
the magnitude of the opportunity. At this juncture we can begin to
discern how the tax saved when a large fortune is placed in a perpetual
trust becomes truly valuable. As important as the elimination of a tax
burden might be in an era when trusts were invested to preserve the
face value of assets, where a perpetual trust is invested subject to
portfolio theory, the tax saved contributes to the size of the res going
forward – and supports the continued justification under the law for
investing at least some portion of the account in aggressive – even
speculative – securities. As tax is saved with each generation and
returns consistent with the risk profile of the account are realized, the
perpetual trust potentially becomes an investment juggernaut. Savings
achieved when creditors’ claims are avoided contribute here as well.
In short, Portfolio Theory when applied to the res of a large perpetual
trust legitimates – indeed encourages -- an entrepreneurial mindset in a
fiduciary which would have been unthinkable in earlier eras. For the
family establishing a perpetual trust to realize the investment potential
to define the consequences of the volatility risk with respect to a particular trust.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
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132
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that a more sophisticated understanding of risk might offer, however,
the trustee becomes a crucial figure.
Nevertheless, corporate
fiduciaries – big banks – remain very conservative when it comes to
investing assets in trust.
The theory of efficient markets
notwithstanding, a recent study of the investment practices of big-bank
fiduciaries indicates that Prudent Investor has had at best a modest
impact on the way these institutions invest. It might be expected that,
in the wake of Prudent Investor, trust portfolios at these institutions
would at a minimum exhibit a significant percentage shift away from
assets where face value is more secure but returns are limited (debt)
toward more volatile assets where return would be greater (common
stock). Since the advent of Prudent Investor, however, this shift has
occurred only to a modest degree.133
But wealthy families seeking to grow their assets in trust are looking
for more than a shift from debt to equity. Take, for example, the risk
inherent in a decision to hold a concentrated position, that is, to
maintain a trust wholly or partially undiversified. Whereas the very
wealthy may welcome an investment methodology that sanctions
reference to the trust portfolio as a whole, these families often do not
want to be encumbered by the finer points of diversification. Indeed, it
is not uncommon for a significant portion of the portfolios of the very
wealthy to be in holdings such as a large block of founder’s stock
(possibly with a low tax-cost basis) or a closely-held operating
company.134 While there is no doubt that Prudent Investor places a
premium on diversification, an argument can be made that would allow
a liberal reading of this requirement, especially where assets are held in
a large perpetual trust. First of all, the Uniform Act is a only a default
regime.135 But further, even the default rule explicitly allows for an
exception where “the trustee reasonably determines that, because of
special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served
without diversifying.”136 Within a large perpetual trust, a case can be
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made that a trustee can justify certain risks that might otherwise not be
consistent with its fiduciary duty.
Nevertheless, big banks remain reluctant to hold concentrated
positions, especially in assets that are illiquid, for which there is little to
no market (like closely-held companies), assets that are common
among the significant holdings of the wealthy.137 Against a more
liberal reading of Prudent Investor, these institutions argue that this
conservative posture is consonant with current law. First and most
basically, Prudent Investor is of relatively recent vintage (so the
argument goes) and thus there is relatively little case law to underscore
the Uniform Act or to inform its application in myriad particular
situations. Indeed, where interpretative authority is not available, some
commentators are inclined to fall back on case law arising under the
Prudent Man statute to inform the category of “prudence.”138 Second,
what case law there is under the new regime still calls into question the
extent to which a trustee can decide not to diversify, even where the
concentrated position is authorized under the trust agreement.139
Finally, the Restatement is more explicitly conservative stating that
“trust provisions are strictly construed against dispensing with the
requirement of diversification altogether.”140 Even where the trustee is
authorized with respect to a concentrated position, such a provision
does not “relieve the trustee of the fundamental duty to act with
prudence,”141 nor does authorization to hold a particular investment and
not diversify a portfolio “constitute an exculpatory clause.”142
Whatever the debate about inferences legitimately drawn from the
Uniform Act, the very wealthy have in important respects moved on.
For them, where investing for a large perpetual trust is concerned,
137
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genuine diversification involves deeper, more sophisticated issues that
merely the appropriate allocation between fixed income and equity or a
decision to hold a concentrated position.
The very wealthy now
appreciate that in a large portfolio genuine diversification requires
representation of different investment philosophies and the inclusion of
investments as wide-ranging as hedge funds, private equity, venture
capital funds and real estate, interests not traded in the public securities
markets. Indeed, to realize the full potential of Portfolio Theory for
purposes of these families, the trustee needs access to state-of-the-art
investment opportunities (vehicles not likely to be publicly traded),
together with the specialized knowledge to assess risk with respect to
such holdings. Large institutional trustees now typically offer a
platform of such investments, but even this menu may not satisfy an
entrepreneurial family willing to search the world for opportunities.
With the advent of Prudent Investor, these families began to press big
bank fiduciaries to accept outside managers, encouraging them to
delegate investment responsibility, especially for purposes of state-ofthe-art assets.143 If Prudent Investor is tolerant of delegation of
fiduciary investment responsibility and would even appear to
encourage it in certain situations,144 like so many apparently
liberalizing aspects of Prudent Investor, delegation remains a
controversial matter for the big bank trustee. This is because the initial
decision to delegate as well as all subsequent decisions with respect to
the delegation are fiduciary acts, carrying with them fiduciary liability.
Prudent Investor is clear that the trustee must have good reasons to
delegate. Once a sufficient rationale for delegation has been developed,
the fiduciary is responsible for the choice of the agent. And after the
agent is selected, the fiduciary must continue to exercise discretion,
establishing the scope and terms of delegation and conducting period
reviews.145 The Restatement takes a similar position.146 Regulations
issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the regulatory
authority for federally chartered banks, sound a similar theme,
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expressly providing that a bank that delegates it authority over
investments is nevertheless deemed to retain “investment discretion.”147
Finally, in those instances where the stars align sufficiently so as to
justify delegation of fiduciary investment responsibility, the total fees
to the trust are likely to be as much as twice the fee that fiduciary
would otherwise charge. Fees charged by big bank fiduciaries have
long been a source of irritation to wealthy families so that the prospect
of paying double makes for a special frustration. While the family
might anticipate that the presence of the outside adviser would result in
a commensurate reduction in the trustee’s fee, the need for on-going
exercise of fiduciary discretion (along with the attendant liability)
provides continuing justification for the bank to impose its standard fee
(or something close to it). And this is the case, even though an outside
agent is providing day-to-day management of certain assets.148
If the theory of efficient markets has come to inform the legal standards
governing the investment of property in trust, what it has put in place is
as much an art as it is a science. Gone are the bright line tests that
separated the investment wheat and chaff into the secure and the
speculative. Now, at least at the margins – and large perpetual trusts
are at the margins – fiduciaries may disagree as to the level of risk
appropriate to an account. And it is for this reason that many families
establishing large perpetual trusts want to place a privately owned,
family trust company at the helm. The complete realization of the
potential of Portfolio Theory when applied to a trust res ultimately
depends on the trustee’s calculus of risk, both in light of an
interpretation of the trust instrument and the beneficiaries’ situations.
For the family establishing a perpetual trust to realize the investment
potential that a more sophisticated understanding of risk might offer,
the trustee is all important.
Part IV: Financial Reproduction and the Family Trust Company
While establishing a family trust company might appear to be the final
frontier in securing a fortune long into the future, more is required. If
wealthy families are going to take unto themselves the role of fiduciary,
in order to bring a sophisticated understanding of risk to bear on trusts
designed as multi-generational investment vehicles, family members
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must be prepared to oversee the day-to-day management of an on-going
enterprise, not the least of which includes making state-of-the-art
investment decisions. In creating a family trust company and making it
trustee of family trusts, financial entropy will not be averted and indeed
much of the family’s financial security is sure to be jeopardized, unless
at least some family members are ready, willing and able to undertake
the considerable responsibility of managing the trust company.
Further, given that the investment horizon here is multi-generational,
this need for financial acumen and indeed personal discipline is also
multi-generational. To ensure that every generation has at least some
family members prepared to bring facilitating attitudes about money,
investing and risk to bear on the family fortune requires attention
within the family to the cultivation of such attitudes from generation to
generation.149 Absent sustained talent and discipline, the slow, steady,
downward trajectory of the trust portfolios of an earlier era will soon in
retrospect bespeak a golden era in the financial life of the family.
In the face of this need to attend to the inter-generational cultivation of
attitudes about wealth and investing (in addition managerial expertise),
there has grown up a considerable industry to guide the very rich in
what might be termed “financial reproduction” or “financial
parenting.”150 The literature of this industry puts forward various
techniques for the transmission of attitudes and perspectives calculated
to foster prudence and indeed industriousness within the family. But at
the end of the day, what this literature counsels is that the family that
would preserve its fortune must become quite self-consciously
identified to its wealth. And further, the family that would manage and
indeed grow its wealth must effectively commit itself to maintain this
identity as a wealthy family across generations. Interestingly, some of
the literature even goes so far as to draw a parallel between the family
that would preserve and grow its fortune and a business enterprise.
This literature of “financial parenting” often takes as is point of
departure a phenomenon termed “affluenza,”– that is, myriad species of
self-indulgence and accompanying desuetude that supposedly
characterize the lives of second- and third-generation members of
wealthy families.151 Investment options notwithstanding, it is this self-
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indulgence and desuetude (so this literature claims) that ensures great
fortunes are soon lost and lends truth to the proverb “shirtsleeves to
shirtsleeves in three generations.”152
But for a wealthy family intending to preserve a great fortune (as in the
instance of a family establishing its own trust company), more is
necessary than simply stemming the tide of second- and thirdgeneration social alienation or indeed decadence. It is not simply a
matter of inculcating moral and cultural values in children so as to
create persons who are capable of responsible personal selfgovernance.153 What a wealthy family is ultimately about (so this
literature counsels) is its fortune – not just preserving it, but ideally
growing it. To do this, members must appreciate the essential attributes
and insights of the generation that made the fortune – the enterprising
generation. Taken together, these attitudes and insights make for a
particular ethos about wealth and privilege. The goal is to have later
generations embrace this ethos with a certain consciousness, knowing
that this set of attitudes -- values instrumental in the family’s financial
success – along with its extraordinary wealth, set the family apart in the
world. Financial educators serving the very wealthy suggest that they
engage their children from an early age in discussions about the
purpose of family wealth (a process called “wealth education”).154 The
idea is to apprehend the family’s “differentness” – that is, the origin of
its privilege as well as the character traits, attitudes and possible
expertise that have sustained this privilege (all of which some term “the
family story”).155 Indeed to underscore the importance of this selfconscious identity, one advisor has even likened the multi-generational
wealthy family to a “tribe.” “Becoming a tribe requires a family to
adopt a form of decision-making that seeks consensus about what
actions will likely perpetuate the tribe’s success and thus its
survival….156
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Given that these families are seeking to maintain their wealth far into
the future,157 however, this education ultimately requires an
institutional framework – a governance structure that will bring
discipline to the development of this ethos and then allow for
constructive reconsideration of it by subsequent generations.158 What
is needed is “a long series of linked transitions” and a system of family
governance that will “guide[] the joint decisions family members must
make to successfully complete those transitions.”159
It is in this way that the Family Mission Statement found its way into
the literature guiding the very wealthy in their efforts at financial
reproduction.
Adopted from the corporate world where such
statements serve to bring specificity and focus to the interactions and
endeavors of diverse protagonists,160 Family Mission Statements were
first put forward for families of average means. The idea was to
catalyze within the family a discussion of its basic values and then
“codify” them into a constitution of sorts. This document is to unify
families around fundamental principles that “get built right into the
very structure and culture of the family.”161 Like any constitution, the
Family Mission Statement serves as a point of reference as the family
moves forward. It can also be revisited and amended in light of
fundamental changes in the family or the larger world.
Still embraced by many people of modest means as a tool of the
broader endeavor of “social reproduction,”162 the Family Mission
Statement has nevertheless acquired a certain edge as wealth educators
now proffer it to the very wealthy in pursuit of the narrower goal of
“financial reproduction.” Most basically, these families are advised
that the process of developing such a statement provides a context in
which a wealthy family can confront the origin and meaning of
privilege in its own instance and, further, reinvent itself as a wealthy
family from generation to generation.163 Interestingly, however,
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especially where the very rich are concerned, some of this literature
draws parallels between the wealthy family seeking continued financial
prosperity and the well-managed business enterprise. The claim is that
the business enterprise provides an apt analogy because, like a
business, the object of the family is “to organize our financial,
intellectual, and human assets for the purpose of the preserving and
enhancing each of these in succeeding generations.”164 One wealth
adviser elaborates: “[T]he most important role in the management of
an enterprise is arranging for orderly succession.”165 And further on:
“Families attempting long-term wealth preservation often don’t
understand that they are businesses and that the techniques of long-term
succession planning practiced by all other businesses are available to
them as well.”166
The wealthy family as business ceases to be a metaphor, however, and
becomes a reality when this literature turns to consider the uses of the
family trust company. While perhaps not appreciating the magnitude
of the investment opportunity presented by these entities (especially
under Prudent Investor), this literature still recognizes that the family
trust company can serve the family in the mechanics of investing – for
example, as a consolidation vehicle, allowing all family holdings to be
managed in one place and subjected to a coordinated, long-term
investment strategy.167 More interestingly, however, is the insight in
this literature that the family trust company can serve as the primary
institutional context for the essential tasks of “financial reproduction”
in all its dimensions and across multiple generations. For a very
wealthy family, myriad aspects of family life can be coordinated
through the trust company. The trust company is a “family seat,” a
“repository of the family history” with a “perpetual life,” a locus for
governance of many types to take place, a meeting place where the
wealthy family interacts and perpetuates its identify as a wealthy
family.168 Most importantly for a family identified to its wealth, the
family trust company provides a context in which successive
generations can be tutored in long-term wealth preservation consistent
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with the family’s particular ethos about money and investing (perhaps
articulated in a family mission statement). The family trust company
presents a golden opportunity to put into play the attitudes and skills
deemed instrumental to the family’s historic financial success. As
successive generations of a family manage their investment risk to
secure their fortune long into the future, successive generations are also
given opportunity to rediscover and indeed reaffirm their
“differentness” – their privilege.169
The suggestion that the family trust company can serve as a context
within which a wealthy family can develop an ethos about money and
investing (and ultimately an identity as a wealthy family) acquires great
resonance when considered alongside the opportunities under the
Prudent Investor statute to invest property in trust, especially where the
portfolio is large enough and the time horizon extended. To realize the
full potential of Prudent Investor as applicable to a large perpetual trust,
a trustee needs a sophisticated understanding of risk and skills
sufficient to choose investments consistent with the risk profile. If a
family is going to take over this role through a family trust company,
these aptitudes must somehow be present in every generation going
forward. What the literature of financial reproduction makes clear,
however, is that the development of these aptitudes in one generation
and the transmission of them to another is (of necessity) about so much
more than investing. As older and younger generations of a family
come together to play various roles in the management of the family
fortune – and to exploit the opportunities available under Prudent
Investor where a fortune is in trust – what is also happening is the
transmission of an identity as a very wealthy and indeed privileged
family.
Conclusion
The tendency of all lawyers (including legal scholars) is to examine
laws seriatim, one by one, and not pursue the combined effects of rules
drawn from diverse areas of the law – neither discerning the
extraordinary burdens of such combined effects nor the opportunities
created by the layering the benefits of various laws not necessarily
intended to be used in concert. The real significance of new laws
affording the very wealthy ready access to the family trust company
cannot be apprehended if the particulars of these rules are examined in
isolation. The opportunity that they afford the extraordinarily rich can
only be seen when we attend to the way these wealthy families intend
to use the family trust company to exploit other laws applicable to the
transfer and administration of funds held in trust. The family trust
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company beautifully positions a wealthy family to exploit the
elimination of the Rule against Perpetuities in certain states to create
perpetual trusts, to “leverage” exemptions from or credits against
federal transfer tax applicable to the transfers into such trusts, and, most
importantly, to make the most of new laws under which the
determination of risk for such trusts has become as much an art as a
science. In addition, the sustained process of gathering together within
the family trust company for the purpose of preserving and growing the
family fortune creates for the wealthy a venue for “financial
reproduction.” The family trust company invites the older generation
to tutor the younger in long-term wealth preservation consistent with
the family’s particular ethos about money and investing. As each
generation embraces and employs this ethos to preserve the family
fortune, each generation becomes quite self-consciously identified to its
wealth, cognizant of its privilege.
Finally, we must not overlook the normative dimension of these
entities. If intransient, radical differences in means are problematic in a
democracy so that the dissipation of great fortunes has generally been
viewed as salubrious, the advent of the family trust company acquires
an additional significance for the larger democratic polity. The
potential of these entities to forestall the dissipation of great fortunes
and the opportunity they provide to the very wealthy to embrace a selfconscious identity as a wealthy family are almost certain to set these
families apart in an experience of living quite different from other
citizens – precisely what many theorists of democracy would seek to
avoid.170
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